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ABSTRACT

This thesis explains how the government of British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to accept the
deployment of American nuclear-armed cruise missiles on
British soil without any physical means of preventing them
from being launched. The missiles were accepted in the face
of massive public opposition to them and particularly to
the absence of a physical means of control known as the
"dual-key" system.
Chapter one defines the "special relationship" between
the UK and the USA, arguing that the relationship grew up
mainly during World War Two and was elaborated upon after
that. Chapter two narrates the history of Anglo-American
defence relations, concentrating on the presence of
American nuclear weapons and delivery systems stationed in
the UK and the agreements concerning control over their
use. Chapter three tells how and why the NATO allies agreed
to the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe. Chapter
four explains why the stationing of cruise in the UK
aroused intense public opposition and examines what British
and American officials and politicians thought the
agreement over the control of cruise actually meant. The
British maintained that the agreement constituted a veto
over their launch? some Americans either denied or refused
to affirm this.
The conclusion is that the USA and the UK have arrived
at a quid pro quo. The USA provides the UK with strategic
delivery systems so that the UK can maintain a nuclear
force under its own control. The UK provides the USA with
bases for American forces and American nuclear weapons;
these bases are essentially under American control.

WHO CONTROLLED CRUISE?
THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE POST-1945 ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP IN DEFENCE

INTRODUCTION

Fall 1983 marked the beginning of the installation of
464 American-owned, ground-launched cruise missiles in
bases in Europe. They had been requested by the European
members of NATO. The Europeans feared that the strategic
parity in nuclear weapons between the United States and the
Soviet Union, the recent Soviet superiority in theater
nuclear weapons and the possibility of a SALT III that
would include theater nuclear missiles would all combine to
limit theater systems in a manner disadvantageous to the
security of Western Europe. Specifically, they were afraid
that Western Europe would be decoupled from American
nuclear forces and would lack the strength in theater
systems to counter the Soviets * corresponding systems.
Thus, the agreement with the United States to provide
nuclear-tipped, theater-range cruise missiles had
originally been hailed by Western European governments as a
sign of Atlantic solidarity in the face of a mounting
Soviet threat.
Amongst the European publics, however, there was
anything but such unanimous approval. In Great Britain, two
criticisms were made of the arrangements to provide cruise.
2
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One was that any increase in any nuclear weapons in any
place, at any time, for any reason was to be deplored. Such
criticism came from the disarmament movement, specifically
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and many members of
the Labor party, in the House of Commons and in the party
as a whole. The other, much more widely voiced criticism of
the arrangements for cruise concerned not the ownership by
Britain of nuclear weapons nor the presence on British soil
of American nuclear weapons, but the means by which the
launching of the wholly American-owned missiles might be
allowed or prohibited by the British government. The
criticism centered on the Thatcher government's refusal to
purchase the so-called "dual key" control system for
cruise. Dual key referred to a system used on the only
other previous occasion when the Americans had agreed with
the British to place missiles not wholly under British
control on British territory. The weapon in question had
been the Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM),
in service in Britain between 1959 and 1963. The dual key
control system meant that the missiles had been bought by
the British, the warheads were owned by the Americans and
the launching of each whole weapon depended on permission
being given by both one American and one British officer by
means of two keys, one in the possession of each officer.
This gave both the American and the British governments an
effective veto on the launching of Thor. Now that a
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comparable weapon was being installed, there was strong
feeling amongst the public and members of Parliament of all
the parties in favor of a new form of the dual-key system.
Yet the Thatcher government successfully resisted the
considerable political pressure generated by this feeling,
insisting that there was a "special relationship" between
the United States and Britain, that this had given a
context for relying on written and verbal assurances by the
Americans that they would not launch any nuclear delivery
system from British territory without the agreement of the
British government and that these assurances were an
adequate safeguard. This thesis will discuss why the
Thatcher government was willing to trust to this special
relationship in a matter of the most vital national
interest.
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first
defines the special relationship. The second traces the
history of the Anglo-American relationship in matters of
nuclear energy and weapons, with a particular emphasis on
nuclear weapons delivery systems based on British territory
and the inter-governmental agreements about them. The third
discusses the issue of who controlled cruise. The fourth
draws conclusions about the refusal of the Thatcher
government to have a dual-key control for cruise and its
implications for the special relationship.
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There are two terms which need some clarification
regarding their use here. The terms "cruise” and "cruise
missile" I shall use to refer to the ground-launched cruise
missile, 160 of which were located at the Greenham Common
and Molesworth air bases in Great Britain. In fact, there
have been and are a great variety of missiles which share
the same characteristics of being low-flying and
air-breathing, beginning with the German V-l, and these
will be referred to by names other than the terms "cruise"
or "cruise missile." The term "dual key" will be used to
refer to the arrangement whereby the warhead would be owned
by the United States and the missile by Great Britain. For
cruise, unlike the control system for the Thor missile,
there would not necessarily be any actual keys. In other
words, the term "dual key" has the merit of conceptual
clarity, since it makes comprehensible popular concern
about whether the British government could physically
prevent the launching of American cruise missiles from
British territory. For the reasons of common usage and
conceptual clarity, I will retain the term.

CHAPTER I

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DEFINED

The most comprehensive definition I have found of the
term "the special relationship" as it pertains to the
subject of this thesis has been given by John Baylis, a
British professor in international politics, in the preface
to his 1984 book, Anglo-American Defense Relations
1939-1984. For this reason I will use it as the basis of my
own definition, adding remarks of my own and by others as
necessary.
For many writers, one crucial feature of the special
relationship has been that, as Baylis notes, "the
particularly close nature of the alliance stems essentially
from sentimental attachments, cultural affinities,
historical traditions, similar institutions and a common
language." He cites Sir Dennis Brogan, author of American
Aspects, observing that "the linguistic and cultural
relationship between England and America is not paralleled
in any other pair of relationships" and quotes the argument
of political science professor Arthur Campbell Turner that,
"the foundation of the special relationship between Britain
and the United States is demographic, the basic fact is
6
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that to a considerable extent the population of the United
States derives from British sources." 1
A second feature has been the convergence of strategic
interests. The two nations have been concerned with
protecting themselves (and to a lesser extent other
nations) against the expansionism of both the Axis powers
during the Second World War, and the USSR after 1945.
Although there have inevitably been differences in
interests between the UK and the USA, these have never
attained sufficient importance for a sufficiently long
period to offset the convergence of strategic interests.
A third feature has been the manner of the
relationship's conduct. Henry Kissinger's detailed
description of this manner, as set down in White House
Years, is well worth quoting at length:
...the special relationship with Britain was peculiarly
impervious to abstract theories. It did not depend on
formal arrangements? it derived in part from the memory of
Britain's heroic wartime effort; it reflected the common
language and culture of two sister peoples. It owed no
little to the superb self-discipline by which Britain had
succeeded in maintaining political influence after its
physical power had waned. When Britain emerged from the
Second World War too enfeebled to insist on its views, it
wasted no time in mourning an irretrievable past. British
leaders instead tenaciously elaborated the "special
relationship" with us. This was, in effect a pattern of
consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became
psychologically impossible to ignore British views. They
evolved a habit of meetings so regular that autonomous
American action somehow came to seem to violate club rules.
Above all, they used effectively an abundance of wisdom and
trustworthiness of conduct so exceptional that successive
American leaders saw it in their self-interest to obtain
British advice before taking major decisions. It was an
extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal
claim; it was formalized by no document? it was carried
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forward by succeeding British governments as if no
alternative were conceivable. Britain's influence was great
precisely because it never insisted on it? the "special
relationship" demonstrated the value of intangibles2
What is striking about this account is its emphasis on
the importance of the manner of the relationship's conduct,
the informality, the (deliberately conditioned) habit of
consultation and, to paraphrase Harold Macmillan, the
willingness of London to play Athens to Washington's Rome.
Such a manner led Kissinger to make the additional
observations that:
One feature of the Anglo-American relationship was the
degree to which diplomatic subtlety overcame substantive
differences. In reality, on European integration the views
of Britain's leaders were closer to de Gaulle's than to
ours; an integrated supranational Europe was as much
anathema in Britain as in France. The major difference
between the French and the British was that the British
leaders generally conceded us the theory — of European
integration or Atlantic unity — while seeking to shape its
implementation through the closest contacts with us. Where
de Gaulle tended to confront us with faits accomplis and
doctrinal challenges, Britain turned conciliation into a
weapon by making it morally inconceivable that its views
could be ignored.3
If we accept that the three elements of common
culture, shared interests and a particular manner of
handling Anglo-American affairs are the defining
characteristics of the special relationship, then a sound
argument can be made for accepting the Second World War as
the period within which the special relationship was mainly
formed, despite Kissinger's comment (which I readily accept
as a qualification) about post-war elaboration. Whereas the
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common culture of course has a considerable history,
interests were not shared as fully prior to the war as
during it and since. One need only consider the American
people's sustained isolationist sentiment between the First
World War and even beyond the outbreak of fighting in
Europe in 1939 as compared with the perceived congruence of
interests in the wars against both Hitler and Hirohito and
in the Cold War that followed, to see that this is so.
Similarly, the unprecedented closeness of the American and
the British governments and the scope of the consultation,
which included most departments of both administrations in
almost all aspects of the war effort, including even the
Manhattan Project, were uniquely a product of the Second
World War.
Bearing in mind that the close consultation only arose
in the Second World War, we can for the purposes of this
study put to one side the argument of H. C. Allen that the
special relationship grew steadily from the Eighteenth
Century onwards, with its contention that the promulgation
of the Monroe Doctrine, the success of isolationism and the
freedom of the American Civil War from European
intervention were all facilitated by British naval
protection. The growth mainly occurred during the Second
World War, with the extreme need to protect the British
Isles against both a direct invasion and a subsequent
blockade by German forces, the later use of Britain as a
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staging area for Operation Overlord and the continuing
requirement for coordination between all the Allied forces
(American, British, and Commonwealth) in the other theaters
of the war.
The contention of British historian H. G. Nicholas that
the special relationship dates from the First World War
does not hold true given the definition I have offered. The
acknowledgement by the two states of strategic
interdependence and the setting up of one joint naval
command do not come close to the intimacy of the liaison in
the war that followed.
Thus, I find myself basically in agreement with
Professor Coral Bell, who dates the special relationship
from 1940, while acknowledging that an "unavowed alliance"
began with the Monroe Doctrine. However, in accepting
Kissinger's observation that the relationship was
assiduously elaborated on after the war, it is worth noting
that Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech at
Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946,
also contained the phrase "a special relationship" and
helped give it a degree of popularity. The American public
and press were at the time indifferent, if not openly
hostile to the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. Yet the
perception in the years that immediately followed that
international communism was a growing menace made Britain
seem an increasingly attractive partner in world affairs.
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This was particularly true among the American political
elite, but they were careful not to acknowledge this in
public. Journalist David Dimbleby and historian David
Reynolds relate in their book An Ocean Apart the delightful
anecdote of Dean Acheson discovering in 1950 a memo written
by a subordinate in which reference was made to the special
relationship. Ordering all copies of the offending document
be burned, Acheson acknowledged "the genuineness of the
special relationship" but believed the memo "could stir no
end of a hullabaloo, both domestic and international."4
Thanks to the insight of the social sciences that the
world of human affairs exists largely in the manner that
the majority of people think it exists, we must acknowledge
this particular date as important, as the special
relationship would become more and more an accepted fact of
Anglo-American relations to the extent that politicians and
bureaucrats heard it first named and then realized it
themselves as a possibility and finally took it for
granted. After Kennedy assumed the Presidency, White House
aide McGeorge Bundy was authorizing a press release that
stated " 'Special relationship' may not be a perfect
phrase, but sneers at Anglo-American reality would be
equally foolish."5
Given either the immediate need for close cooperation,
as in the Second World War, or the promulgation of the idea
of the relationship as being essential for the maintenance
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of peace and the growth of what Churchill called "world
organization", the intimate manner of the consultative
process became self-reinforcing, as noted by H. G.
Nicholas:
The working relationships thus established not only
guarantee a smooth discharge of decisions arrived at the
highest levels? they reflect and create a climate of common
purpose and frank discussion. Consequently they persist, by
a healthy momentum of their own, even when, as at Suez,
rupture and conflict impair the functioning of "the highest
levels."6
Such working relationships require large staffs in the
embassies of each state to the other and we may well agree
with Nicholas' observation on the diplomats involved that,
"What the activities of these practitioners are helping to
create is hardly indeed, in the conventional sense of the
term an alliance at all? it is more nearly a community."7
The facility with which working relations are conducted and
the possibility of a community are both helped by the fact
that, as Arthur Campbell Turner observed of the
demographics of Americans with a British background in
1930, "The British immigrants...tended to occupy a more
than average proportion of professional and administrative
posts."8 Despite the fact that American foreign policy now
has a heavy emphasis on relationships with nations of the
Pacific Rim, it is unlikely that the American establishment
can develop an equivalent special relationship with, say,
Japan, unless circumstances conspire to force the two
nations together and, perhaps more importantly, there are
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enough Asian Americans in high political and administrative
office who have that intangible "feel” for the other
nation.
To describe the special relationship as having certain
characteristics and even to go into the ramifications of
those characteristics is not, however, sufficient to
capture the special relationship in its totality. In order
to do that, we must catch the relationship ”on the wing",
as it were. Only by seeing how the relationship manifests
itself in specific events over a period of time and how
those events can in their turn effect the relationship can
the relationship be fully understood. In other words, the
relationship, while susceptible to characterization, can
best be understood, like many other social phenomena, as a
process, rather than as a thing. For this reason, the
decision by the British government under Margaret Thatcher
to accept cruise without dual-key has to be analyzed in the
context of the how the American and British governments
have in the past handled their relationship in the fields
of nuclear energy and weapons and nuclear weapons delivery
systems.

CHAPTER II
WHOSE BOMB IS IT ANYWAY?

It took some time for the British to persuade the
Americans that British scientists could make a useful
contribution to the effort to research and construct the
atomic bomb which had been theorized about before even the
outbreak of the Second World War. Once cooperation on
nuclear matters got under way and the construction of an
atomic weapon seemed likely, it was then necessary for the
two allies to begin to formalize their relations in the
whole atomic field.
The single most important agreement on atomic affairs
came with the signing by Churchill and Roosevelt of the
Quebec Agreement in August, 1943. This gave the British an
effective veto on the American use of the atomic bomb,
thanks to the stipulation that neither state would use the
weapon against a third party without the consent of its
ally. As a quid pro quo and one which was intended to allay
suspicions in Congress of British intentions with regard to
the commercial exploitation of atomic energy after the end
of the war, the British agreed that the American President
could set the terms for the industrial and commercial use
14
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of atomic energy in the future. This effectively allowed
the Americans to dictate how the British could develop
their post-war atomic energy program.
The Ottawa agreement was further clarified in September
1944 by the Hyde Park aide-memoire. also signed by the two
leaders. In this, it was agreed that the two countries
would continue their full collaboration in developing
nuclear energy for military and commercial purposes until
this was terminated by joint agreement. In due course,
Churchill gave his agreement to the use of atomic bombs
against Japan, though he was not consulted about specific
targets and did not consider his agreement to be more than
a formality.
However, it soon transpired that some members of the
American government were deeply unhappy with the terms of
the Quebec Agreement and the aide-memoire as Simon Duke
explained in US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom.
Dean Acheson had argued against the acceptability of the
Quebec Agreement primarily for strategic reasons, but the
official line of argument was political. It was argued that
the agreement imposed a restraint upon the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to act freely in the national
interest and it was therefore unconstitutional. At the end
of 1945 there were moves afoot to change the agreement,
with a recommendation to the Combined Policy Committee that
a new document should be prepared to replace the Quebec
Agreement 1in toto1. The new proposal in its first clause
recommended that the governments of the US, Canada, and the
United Kingdom 'will not use atomic weapons against other
parties without prior consultation with each other', thus
aiming directly at Clause 2 of the Quebec Agreement which
had expressed atomic weapons would not be used without each
other's consent. The meeting between Truman, Attlee and
Mackenzie-King of Canada in November 1945, and subsequent
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meeting, failed to persuade Britain to give up her veto
right.
Yet matters took a very different semblance the
following year, as the Americans became most unwilling to
continue to share their atomic secrets. Not only did Truman
and some of his senior advisors, like Secretary James
Byrnes, feel this way, so did the Senate Atomic Energy
Committee, as Robin Edmonds, a former official with the
British Foreign Office, explained in his book, Setting the
Mould. Following the British decision to build a plutonium
-producing reactor and the discovery of a spy ring in
Canada, which included Alan Nunn May, a British physicist
who had worked on the Montreal atomic project, the
Committee acted swiftly. In the space of nine days, they
amended a section of the McMahon bill on atomic energy and
provided for the full range of penalties for criminal
actions involving unauthorized dissemination of 'restricted
data' which was defined in terms that allowed very little
latitude.10
This prohibited the passage of atomic information from the
United States to any other country. McMahon himself years
later agreed that had he been told of Anglo-American
cooperation in the atomic field, the legislation would have
been less restrictive. It would take Eisenhower and the
shock of the Sputnik launch to persuade Congress that
cooperation in atomic affairs should be fully resumed with
the United Kingdom. In the meantime, the British initiated
their own program for the development of an atomic bomb,
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out of fear of renewed American isolationism, of a need to
remain a great power and of a desire to bring the Americans
to believe that the partnership might, indeed should, be
renewed.
In January of 1948, the Americans and the British
revised their arrangements on atomic matters in a document
called the modus vivendi. The United States was to receive
a much greater share of the uranium ore coming out of the
Congo, which had previously been divided on a fifty-fifty
basis, in return for renewed cooperation and exchange of
information with Britain. Also, the British power of veto
over the American use of atomic weapons was dropped, in
return for the Americans dropping their restrictions on the
British industrial development of atomic energy. In keeping
with what was becoming standard practice for the post-war
relationship, the modus vivendi was a general declaration
of intent and no document was ever signed. Thus, the
President did not have to refer the matter to Congress.
Secrecy was maintained on both sides of the Atlantic.
Opinions on the quality of the agreement vary. The view
of Lord Sherfield, who participated in the negotiations, is
that the modus vivendi opened the door slammed shut by the
McMahon Act. The other view, propounded by Margaret Gowing,
is that the British gave away their veto over the American
use of atomic weapons for too little in return.
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Margaret Gowing, the official historian of Britain's
atomic energy program, criticizes the modus vivendi for
giving away the British veto at all, when the American use
of the atomic bomb might eventually have led to Britain's
"annihilation." The use of the word "annihilation" in this
context is tendentious. After all, the veto was given up in
January 1948 and the Soviet Union was not known to have
acquired its own atomic capability until 1949. From the
perspective of the British government of the time, it might
have seemed much more pressing to acquire the additional
wherewithal to develop its own atomic industry than to
worry about the possibility of the Soviet Union sometime in
the future dropping an atomic device on London because of
something the Americans had done. Even if one does not
share Gowing's views fully, one can still agree with her
that the British giving up of the veto was strange in one
particular respect, that the British did not even press to
have the word "consultation" substituted for the word
"consent," though the British chiefs of staff had proposed
this in 1947.
Shortly after the veto was given up, there came the
Berlin crisis and a turn of events which had serious
implications for Anglo-American relations in matters of the
control of American atomic delivery systems based in
British territory. To understand this we must go back to
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1945 and some talks between USAAF General Carl Spaatz and
the British Air Marshal, Sir Arthur Tedder.
The two men were concerned about the strength and
growing influence of the Soviet Union and the weakness of
post-war Europe. They pondered that if the USA wanted to
deploy its B-29 bombers to Europe, no British airfield
could accommodate them and so they decided in July 1946
that four bases should be made ready for these aircraft by
mid-1947. Atomic bomb assembly and loading facilities were
constructed at some bases. All of this was done without any
public debate on the subject. The Strategic Air Command had
in March 194 6 implemented a policy of "rotating" small
units of B-29s abroad to give crews training in regions
where they might operate in the future. The new bases fit
in with the rotation scheme perfectly. None of the
Silverplate B-29s (those converted to carry atomic weapons)
were actually based in Europe until the summer of 1949, but
for propaganda purposes, non-Silverplates still had the
reputation of being atomic bombers.
The 1948-49 blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union led
not only to a massive airlift, but also to the British
government agreeing to base sixty American B29s. The sixty
arrived in July 1948, with the total number rising to
ninety in September of the same year. However, the
circumstances of this deployment were most revealing of how
the special relationship was evolving in the Cold War era.
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Baylis accounts for the aircrafts* arrival as follows:
The reasons for the arrival of the aircraft in Britain, at
least initially, were political rather than military. They
were a token of US interest in the defence of Europe. Their
symbolic effect was emphasized by the fact that although
the B29 was the American delivery vehicle for atomic
weapons the B29s in Britain were not modified until 1949/50
to carry nuclear bombs.11
Investigative journalist and defence specialist Duncan
Campbell provides additional and more detailed evidence in
The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, his book on the American
military presence in the United Kingdom. He explains the
schedule for the B29 force being converted to Silverplates
and for some being based in Britain.
At the end of 1948, the 30 Silverplate aircraft were still
at their US home base of Roswell, New Mexico. Gradually,
the rest of the force was converted, and the first A-bomb
carriers came to England in 1949. By late 1950, all the
bombers returning to Britain from the United States on
"rotational tours" had been converted.12
What is most striking, however, is that according to
Campbell, the British government itself did not know
whether the B-29s were Silverplates or not. If this were
not remarkable enough, Duke guotes a Foreign Office
document that:
The USAF already had the informal authority to rotate
medium bomber groups to the United Kingdom under the
Spaatz-Tedder agreement and that *we seem committed to the
proposal [to base the 60 B-29s] in principle, a fact of
which the Prime minister does not appear aware1.13
Finally, Campbell notes, "no guestions were raised at the
political level about the terms and conditions of the
Americans* tenure"14 Taken together, these facts indicate a
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profound confusion in the British government's management
of its defence relations with the USA. A naive trust
substituted for decision-making based on facts, clearly
defined policy aims, and coordination between different
parts of the British administration.
Exactly why the British were so keen to allow the
bombers to be based in Britain remains a little unclear.
Baylis observes that:
Mr Bevin [the British Foreign Secretary] in particular
welcomed the presence of US bombers in Britain as helping
to bind the United States closer to Western European
defence.15
Duke gives a more complex explanation for the acceptance:
Fear of Russian expansionist aims in Europe following the
successful Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the imminent
withdrawal of Russia from the Berlin Kommandatura, fear of
an American retreat into isolationism that characterized
the interwar years, and last, but not least, the SpaatzTedder agreement effectively making any other decision
improbable.16
To this list we might add Britain's profound economic and
military weakness. Yet all these compelling reasons for
admitting the bombers are not reasons for handling the
matter in such a confused manner. Furthermore, there was
certainly no public discussion about the B-29 deployment.
(This silence regarding military nuclear affairs has since
become an established fact of British political life.) It
is difficult to disagree with Duke's conclusion that while
the British government had considered the implications of
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temporary presence, little attempt had been made to
consider the future.
However, as investigative reporter David Henshaw
explained in an article on dual-key in The Listener
magazine, the Americans had been eager to get air bases in
Britain for quite some time:
But right from the start there was a considerable
discrepancy between American plans for the bases and the
official British version of how long they were here for and
what they were equipped to do. Only one MP — the renegade
Labor lawyer John Platts-Mills — questioned the arrival of
the B-29s: he was told they were here on a temporary
mission for "goodwill and training." And yet on the very
day the bombers flew in, the American Defence Secretary,
James Forrestal, wrote in his diary: "We have the
opportunity now of sending these planes, and once sent,
they would become something of an accepted fixture." If the
American were keen to seize this opportunity, it was
because their planes were still limited in range; so that,
while they still had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, they
needed forward bases, close to the Soviet Union, from which
to launch an attack. Documents previously classified as
"top secret", but now available under the American Freedom
of Information Act at the National Archive in Washington,
show that as early as October 1945 the Pentagon generals
were considering a policy of "first strike" and that
Britain was one of three base areas close to the USSR that
they might have to "seize and hold." In July 1948, the
bases were obtained by invitation.17
The Americans began to develop this strategic facility
soon thereafter. September 1948 saw the United States
initiate negotiations between the American and British
Chiefs of Staff to allow the construction of buildings at
the Sculthorpe and Lakenheath bases to house components of
atomic bombs. Silverplate B-29s first arrived in April 1950
and the President approved the stockpiling of non-nuclear
components of atomic bombs in the UK in July 1950, which
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meant that only the nuclear cores need be moved to Britain
in the event of a crisis. For a while, the American view
was that Britain was too vulnerable a location for
stockpiling all the components or complete nuclear weapons.
This view changed with the coming of the Eisenhower
administration and in June 1953, the President agreed that
the US military could store complete nuclear weapons at
bases abroad.
As of 1950, all Western nuclear weapons remained
entirely under American control. A 1950 plan to transfer
some atomic bombs to the British was killed by the State
Department, which emphasized the need to maintain the
American stockpile and the possibility that the British
might not actually use the weapons in the event of war.
British concern about American bases centered around the
costs of construction work. The Ambassador's Agreement of
April 1950 (an exchange of letters between the US
Ambassador and a representative of the British government)
confirmed how the bases were to be expanded and how the
construction costs were to be shared. There was also an
assurance of the British right to terminate the agreement.
Yet that was all. The stationing of American forces was not
given a time limit and there was no attempt to secure
British control over the use of the bases.
If the British were anxious about the Berlin blockade,
they had a good deal more to be anxious about two years
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later. With Truman’s threat to end the Korean war by using
atomic bombs, the British found that: they did not have
either a veto over nor a right to be consulted about the
American use of atomic weapons; the Americans did have an
atomic weapons delivery system on British soil? the British
did not have anv agreement at all on the operational use of
the bases given over to the Americans. Worse still, the
Soviet Union now did have the capability to retaliate with
atomic weapons against an ally of the United States (for
instance, Great Britain) if one of its friends (for
instance, the newly-formed People's Republic of China) were
victim to Truman's threat. Prime Minister Attlee hurried
across the Atlantic to dissuade President Truman from
acting on his threat. No doubt he was hastened on his way
by the fact that the British were at that time wholly
ignorant as to the contents of the US Strategic Air Plan.
Clearly, from the British point of view, that they should
have no control over the use of the bases and no idea of
how the USAF might drop its atomic bombs was a state of
affairs which could not be allowed to continue, no matter
how "special" the relationship.

Attlee's meeting with

Truman was riddled with ambiguity. Truman was willing to
promise "consultation" verbally, but would not put this in
writing. The Americans again fell back on their argument
about the President being unable to limit his powers as
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Commander-in-Chief. The final wording of the communique
was:
The President stated that it was his hope that world
conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb.
The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his
desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of
developments which might bring about a change in the
situation.18
This was the only document which emerged from the meeting.
The Americans refused to accept the British record of the
meeting, since it contained the word "consultation" with
reference to atomic bombs. Attlee nevertheless affirmed to
the Cabinet in December 1950 that the British would be
consulted except in "an extreme urgency" and told the House
of Commons that the President's assurances were "perfectly
satisfactory. "19
The British were in fact still concerned about the need
for consultation and their lack of knowledge about the US
Strategic Air Plan. They continued to raise the issue in
1951, with the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington in
September. This led to more talks, involving the British
Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, and representatives of the
Truman administration. Consultation was again affirmed by
the Americans in private, but Franks was concerned to get
something agreed upon for public consumption before the
British general election of October 25. The agreement was
in fact made public after that date when Churchill
announced it in the House of Commons in December 1951.

26

The agreement which was reached is the form of words
still used by the British government today in reply to any
query regarding its degree of control over the use of
American bases on British territory and the nuclear weapons
and the delivery systems that are stationed there. The
relevant sentence reads: f,The use of these bases in an
emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her
Majesty*s Government and the United States Government in
•

•

•

•

•

the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."
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The crucial words here are "joint decision" and much of the
cruise missile debate in Britain has been over their exact
meaning. This debate over the interpretation is a matter
for the next chapter.
At the January 1952 summit between Churchill and
Truman, the talks proceeded in the same manner as previous
talks. Consultation about the use of atomic weapons from
bases in Britain was affirmed, but not included in any
written statement. The final communique again used the
"joint decision" wording. However, Churchill did make the
very real gain of being briefed on the Strategic Air Plan.
Following the first test of an atomic bomb by Britain
in October 1952 and the election of Eisenhower, further
agreements about the US bases, in terms of what facilities
would be provided and at what cost, were made between the
two countries, but as usual not in the form of a treaty, as
that would have necessitated disclosure in Parliament and
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to the public of the terms. From 1954 onwards, the McMahon
Act was gradually watered down and it was repealed in 1958.
This led to Britain obtaining the information necessary to
build atomic power plants for submarines, which in turn
allowed the British to accept the offer of the Polaris
missile system in 1962, since they could build the
submarines to carry them.

(In May 1957, the British proved

that they were not so far behind in other fields by
detonating their first thermonuclear device.)
The 1956 Suez crisis severely strained the special
relationship but it is an indication of just how
extraordinary the relationship can be that one of the first
steps taken by the Americans to restore it to its former
good health was to offer Britain some intermediate-range
Thor ballistic missiles (IRBMs), free. The offer was made
in January 1957. Prime Minister Macmillan accepted the
offer at a conference with President Eisenhower at Bermuda
in March of the same year. All 60 Thors were in service by
May 1960. As well as wanting to restore the special
relationship, Macmillan was also eager for the British to
have a missile system which they had not at that stage been
able to develop themselves and for the British military to
have hands-on experience with state-of-the-art missile
technology.
The Americans had a number of compelling motives for
stationing IRBMs in the United Kingdom. The New Look

28

defence policy had led to an emphasis on relying on nuclear
weapons to take the place of large, conventional forces.
Many tactical and theater nuclear weapons systems were
deployed in Europe at this time to bolster the relatively
small NATO forces in the face of an overwhelming Soviet
conventional capability. In The Politics of Weapons
Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. Michael Armacost
draws an interesting parallel between Thor and the B29
bomber.
Above all, however, the transfer of Thors was appealing
because, as in 1949, in adjusting to a technological
revolution in strategic delivery systems, the United States
found itself developing first-generation systems whose
range required advanced bases for any strategic utility.
And as in the late 1940s when B29s were emplaced on British
bases, the desire for immediate deployment overcame the
reluctance to resume a posture of mutual dependency.21
Thus, deployment was spurred by the quickening technology
race between the USA and the USSR, a race which would come
to public attention later in the year with the launch of
the Sputnik satellite. Finally, one should not overlook the
fact that the British agreed to pay for the privilege of
basing the weapons, a minor factor, but one sure to appeal
to the budget-conscious Eisenhower.
In an article in the (London) Sunday Times the
newspaper's defence correspondent made one of the few
recent public mentions of the agreements for the control of
the sixty Thor missiles:
After a succession of nuclear developments in the mid-50s,
something much more specific [than the 1952 agreement] was
needed. In the run-up to the arrival of Thor missiles, and
soon after the acquisition of the British independent
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deterrent, Harold Macmillan, then prime minister, put his
mind to negotiating a detailed and precise "procedural
paper." The result, thrashed out between Patrick (now Sir
Patrick) Dean, a deputy under-secretary at the Foreign
Office, and a State Department official named Murphy, is
still so classified that it is not supposed to exist. The
agreement lays out just how the command and control of
American nuclear forces based in Britain would work in time
of crisis.
Since 1958 it has been adapted to take account of
subsequent nuclear developments, and it has been reaffirmed
every time a new prime minister or president takes office.
It makes clear that the release of nuclear weapons from
British soil cannot take place without the prior agreement
of the British government. That is a much better guarantee
than any of America's other allies have secured [under the
1962 Athens Guidelines].22
Campbell, however, claims that Dean-Murphy did not
significantly modify the existing arrangements. It is
widely accepted that the secret part of the Anglo-American
base agreements is periodically updated. The extent to
which any single update marks a "significant" change is
largely a matter of conjecture.
Until 1989, the arrangements for control over Thor and
the rationale for the arrangements had seemed quite
straightforward. The rationale was that only physical
control was finally sufficient for the British national
interest. Rather than accept the missiles free, even with
dual-key control, the deal was that the British would in
fact own the missiles, the Americans the warheads. The
British would provide the base facilities. Dual-key was
promoted as a sign of renewed trust between the USA and UK.
The announcement that the missiles would come to Britain
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and the terms of their siting was made on February 27,
1958.
It is national policy in Britain to keep secret
documents under lock and key for thirty years. At that time
their current status is assessed again and some are
released. When the papers for 1958 were released in 1959,
The Observer reported that there had been a second, secret
part to the Thor basing agreement:
Britain was forced onto deceiving its own public; although
Macmillan persuaded President Eisenhower to let the
missiles have British crews while the US controlled the
warheads, he also accepted a secret second half to the
deal. In the secret letters of understanding, the Americans
were promised that they could apply to instal more Thor
missiles, with US crews, when and if they wanted.
Meanwhile, [Defense Secretary] Sandys told the Commons the
US had not asked to control the missiles themselves.23
Further, Macmillan had even considered scrapping the
British nuclear deterrent on the grounds that it was more
for prestige than military use and cost too much.
The dual-key control of Thor had two crucial political
limitations. The first was its applicability to a limited
number of a potentially larger number of missiles. The
second, and politically most important limitation, was that
dual-key was limited to the Thor system. This physical
control over Thor by the British led to Macmillan being
asked what control the British government had over the SAC
bases and their nuclear weapons. Macmillan replied:
I have the assurance of the US government that pilots have
specific instructions not to arm the weapons until they are
directly ordered to do so in order to carry out an
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operation of war. Such an order would be given after
agreement between the two governments.24
Small wonder, then, that during the 1983 controversy
about a dual key for cruise, the Conservative government
tried to bury the idea as quickly as possible. If it had
come to light that the Thor dual-key arrangement had been
part of a larger and secret deal by a previous Conservative
administration, that would have been highly inflammatory in
itself. But actually having a dual-key for cruise would
have made Prime minister Thatcher as vulnerable as
Macmillan to the same questions regarding British control
over other American nuclear systems based in the United
Kingdom.
Barely was the Parliamentary debate (and Sandys' lying)
over than both governments found themselves severely
embarrassed, as Macmillan recalled:
There was a great "flap" this morning over an extraordinary
statement by a certain Colonel Zinc — an American "Eagle
Colonel" of the Air Force who claims to be about to take
over operational command of the rockets and rocket bases in
England. As this is in direct contradiction (a) to the
terms of the agreement published last Monday (b) what we
told Parliament on Monday and in the debate yesterday.
Colonel Zinc has put his foot in it on a grand scale.
As Baylis notes:
The Prime Minister no doubt had the "Colonel Zinc incident"
in mind when he went to Washington on 7 June 1958. In his
discussions with the American President, Macmillan once
again brought up the question of US bases in Britain and
the use of bombs and warheads which were under joint
control. As a result both heads of state apparently
initialled an agreement at the end of the talks which
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replaced "the loose arrangement made by Attlee and
confirmed by Churchill."26
Both countries had agreed that the 1952 agreement was
inadequate and had replaced it. Yet, when the debate began
over accepting cruise, without a dual-key control, it was
to the 1952 document that reference was exclusively made by
the Thatcher government in public addresses and
Parliamentary debate alike.
The Thor system was withdrawn from service in 1963. The
system was one of liquid-fuelled missiles which were
supposed to take some fifteen minutes to ready for launch
and which were kept above ground. In fact, launch
preparation took so many hours that it was possible that
Thor might still have been on the ground when a second wave
of Soviet missiles arrived.

(It was even alleged that the

missiles could be destroyed by rifle fire and a .22 rifle
at that.) It was hardly surprising that they became more of
a threat to the owner as a likely target for a wholly
successful pre-emptive strike than a deterrent to the
Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, in 1960, the American were allowed port
facilities for their nuclear missile submarines at Holy
Loch in Scotland, in return for allowing the British the
right to purchase the Skybolt ballistic missile. Britain
had also expressed an interest in acquiring Polaris.
Macmillan recalled the deal in his memoirs.
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The President and I had merely exchanged a note and in
return for Skybolt I had agreed, also *in principle1, to
the establishment of an American submarine base in
Scotland. Actual details were to be set out in a formal
agreement....Everything was soon arranged, and the Minister
of Defence was soon able to conclude a formal agreement
regarding Skybolt, while maintaining our claim to Polaris,
if this should at any time become necessary. It was this
undertaking, entered into by President Eisenhower, that his
successor was to honour, at my request, two years later.27
Though there was a Parliamentary debate about the base in
December, 1960, the Labor party was, happily for Macmillan,
sharply divided between those pressing for unilateral
nuclear disarmament and those advocating a multilateral
approach. This left it unable to launch an effective
opposition to the base agreement.
Once Skybolt failed miserably in testing, the British
played on the special relationship to obtain Polaris and
succeeded at the Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau summit in
December 1962 in the face of strong opposition from some
members of the Kennedy administration to having more than
one center of command in a time of crisis (such as the
Cuban missile crisis which had transpired in October). In
April 1963, the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed and
Britain was assured of a deterrent for many years to come,
with the Polaris submarine and the Vulcan bomber forces as
its components. There was no question that these systems
were anything other than wholly under British operational
control. Though the British had to rely on the Americans
for a great deal of nuclear technology, only the British
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could launch their Polaris missiles or their Vulcan
bombers. With regard to the British proposal for an
Atlantic nuclear force (a counter-proposal to the
multilateral nuclear force the British detested for its
very threat of taking away British control over British
nuclear weapons), Harold Wilson assured the Commons on
December 16, 1964, that there was no possibility of a
dual-key control system for British Polaris missiles. After
1964, public concern shifted from nuclear weapons to other
issues and the politicians and the military in Britain were
generally well enough satisfied with the state of the
nuclear deterrent.

CHAPTER III
CRUISE, KEYS. CONTROVERSY

During the 1970s successive British governments became
concerned about two nuclear weapons issues. One was the
prospect of having to update Britain's nuclear deterrent
for the 1980s and beyond as the Polaris missiles and the
submarines carrying them approached obsolescence. As an
interim step, the Heath government decided to update the
Polaris system by putting multiple warheads on the missiles
and the Callaghan government continued the programme.
The other issue was the apparent danger that the SALT
II treaty might decouple the European members of NATO from
the nuclear deterrent provided by American strategic
systems. The fear was that SALT II would leave the two
superpowers with a parity in strategic systems, while the
Europeans would then be faced with a Soviet superiority in
theater nuclear weapons. Theater nuclear weapons are
nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft which both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact deploy in Europe and aim at targets in Europe.
The two issues eventually became intertwined for the
British at the Guadaloupe summit of the USA, Britain,
France, and West Germany in January 1979.
35
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As part of the reevaluation of their deterrent, the
British became concerned about the need to find a
replacement for the Vulcan bomber as it grew older during
the 1970s. The Carter administration was considering
extending the life of the B52 bomber by giving it a
stand-off capability. The aircraft would have a payload of
cruise missiles that could be launched well away from the
borders of the Soviet Union so that the B52 could leave the
missiles to do the work of penetrating Soviet air defenses
and delivering the nuclear warhead. The British thought
that the Vulcan might also be remodelled in this way, but
it transpired that the aircraft was simply too old. Yet
this decision against using the Vulcan to launch cruise led
to the missile system alone being viewed with increasing
favor by the British defence establishment. Cruise
represented a new technology, with the promise of being
able to penetrate Soviet air defenses readily on a wide
range of types of mission, with a nuclear or non-nuclear
payload as desired. If there were any misgivings, they were
mostly on the part of the Royal Air Force, who feared
cruise might almost eliminate the need for piloted
aircraft. Further, the missile appeared cheap if compared
on a one-for-one basis with any of the larger ballistic
missiles (though this cost-saving was illusory, being in
fact outweighed by the considerable expense of the backup
systems like the TERCOM guidance system and the satellites
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which serviced it and gave cruise its supposed extreme
accuracy). This led to some debate about the suitability of
cruise as the next generation British deterrent. The final
decision was that the Trident I missile was the best option
and that the Americans should be asked to sell it to
Britain.
Meanwhile, all the members of NATO, including Britain
and the United States, were becoming caught up in the
debate about theater nuclear weapons. The first major
discussion of the topic was when Western defense ministers
gathered at Hamburg in January 1976 for a meeting of the
NATO Nuclear Planning Group. The first public expression of
the debate was the October 1977 speech by West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on the subject. The overriding
concern of the United States was that this debate should
end well for NATO, which had recently been shaken by a
debate about the neutron bomb which had ended badly and
divisively. Thus 1976 to 1979 saw a great deal of
diplomatic activity both within NATO circles and outside
it, among the member nations, as the allies tried to put
together an agreement on theater nuclear weapons which
would satisfy everyone. One crucial meeting was the
Guadaloupe summit in January 1979.
Guadaloupe was convened at the behest of the White
House. According to John Newhouse's account, in War and
Peace in the Nuclear Age, it was probably the brainchild of
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser. At
any rate it was Brzezinski who claimed credit for it later
and who personally contacted the European heads of state,
James Callaghan, Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt.
From the American viewpoint, Brzezinski told Newhouse,
"We needed to establish some sense of strategic direction
after the ERW [neutron bomb] debacle."28 Carter also needed
European support for SALT II to encourage the Senate to
ratify it. Carter's NSC staff saw the summit as the ideal
opportunity to propose the deployment of cruise and
Pershing II missiles as the answer to the theater nuclear
weapons problem. Thus far, this idea had been discussed
only at the lower levels of NATO.
The British saw Guadaloupe as the ideal time to
approach the United States for Trident. Prime Minister
Callaghan had an excellent rapport with Carter. Also, the
summit itself was planned to be highly informal. The only
other people present were the leaders' national security
advisors and the leaders' families. Callaghan would
therefore have the best opportunity to exert his personal
influence over Carter.
As Callaghan recollects in his memoirs, Time and
Chance, he was able to approach Carter when the President
was alone. He explained that he needed to know the American
position regarding a possible sale of Trident. Callaghan
had already paved the way for the discussion by eliciting
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Schmidt's opinion that Germany would prefer that France was
not the only European power with strategic nuclear weapons.
This allowed him to argue that Britain might need Trident
both for its own security and also to reassure the West
Germans:
The President heard me out. He said that like Helmut
Schmidt, he also was glad that Britain possessed the
nuclear deterrent. He did not take up my comments about
Germany directly, but said that he hoped that Britain as
well as France would remain a nuclear power. In his view,
it was better that there should be a shared responsibility
in Europe, rather than that American should go it alone, as
he would not wish the United States to be the only country
in confrontation.29
Carter agreed that "he could see no objection to
transferring this technology to the United Kingdom"30 and
further agreed that two British officials should visit
Washington to discuss the technical and financial details.
(Neither Carter's 1982 memoirs, Keeping Faith, nor
Brzezinski's 1983 memoirs, Power and Principle, give any
account of the conversation. Callaghan's memoirs were
published in 1987, by which time the Trident deal had been
settled between the Thatcher and Reagan governments.)
Carter, Callaghan, and Schmidt agreed at Guadaloupe
that cruise and Pershing II should be deployed to counter
the growing number of SS-20 missiles being deployed by the
USSR. They also agreed that continuing talks with the USSR
might lead to an agreement that would eliminate the SS-20s
and so avert any need for NATO to deploy the new weapons.
These decisions were to become official NATO policy on
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December 12, 1979, when the alliance formally agreed to the
deployment. The deploy-and-negotiate concept was popularly
referred to as the "two-track” policy.
For the purposes of this study, there are two crucial
questions regarding the decisions taken at the Guadaloupe
summit. Was the British agreement to accept the basing of
cruise missiles in the UK linked to the American agreement
to sell Britain the Trident system? Was any decision taken
about providing the cruise missiles with a dual key
control?
The evidence collected by Newhouse leads him to
conclude that the cruise basing and Trident sales were
implicitly linked.
And was there a link between the two-track decision and
Trident? "The link was never explicit," says a closely
involved British official. "People here [in London] were
well aware of the lurking danger of repeating the history
of the early sixties [a reference to Skybolt]. We had
expected a very tough negotiation, but it turned out we
were pushing on an open door."31
Newhouse also asked David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy, about
a possible link.
"We expected a lot of help from the British [on the twotrack decision]," says Aaron. "And it wasn't necessary to
link support for it and the Trident. The Brits were bending
over backward to help. 'You want to deploy cruise missiles
in Britain,' they said. 'Go ahead and do it.'" According to
Aaron, there was little resistance to approving Callaghan's
request for Trident.32
In short, the British acquiescence to cruise deployment
preempted any need for the Americans to make an explicit
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link. Both sides knew that an implicit link already
existed.
Was the issue of control discussed at Guadaloupe?
According to Aaron, it was.
"They never discussed the first question: Should we do this
at all?" says David Aaron, who as deputy NSC advisor also
played a major role. "They only discussed the mix of force
options. Whether the weapons should be all US."33
The way in which Aaron phrased his remark and the fact that
he does not mention dual-control, suggests that the leaders
decided at Guadaloupe to deploy the missiles under sole
American control.
They would have had several compelling reasons for
reaching such a decision. The issue of control over nuclear
weapons based on West German territory has always been a
delicate one for West German leaders, who have wanted the
protection they believe is afforded by such weapons, but
have not wanted to confront the USSR with a nuclear-armed
West Germany. It has been in the best interests of the West
Germans that no nuclear munitions on their territory are
under their control. None of the leaders at Guadaloupe
would have wanted to change this state of affairs,
particularly while SALT II was still alive and well.
Further, the whole point of the new weapons was to
couple the USA with its European allies, that is, to
convince the USSR that the USA would use its nuclear
weapons to defend those allies. Dual-key control might tend
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to weaken the deterrent value of the weapons, since the use
of the weapons would be subject to more than one veto.
Finally, it would have weakened the show of unity which
theater nuclear weapons deployment was supposed to produce,
if one nation opted for dual-key while others did not.
After Guadaloupe, a good deal of consultation and armtwisting brought both the enthusiastic and the recalcitrant
European members of NATO more or less behind the proposal
to deploy the missiles. The first public announcement of
the scheme was made by the Carter administration on January
19, 1979. According to The New York Times, administration
officials said that Guadaloupe conferees "made no firm
decision on the missile question" but that they "agreed
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 'should explore
very actively' its options..."34 Thus the Carter
administration immediately put the issue into the NATO
arena to avoid any impression that the four leaders were
trying to dictate policy to the whole of Western Europe and
to make it a vital issue for NATO, which would allow
pressure to be put on NATO members which did not want to
fall in line with the scheme.
When Schmidt tried to back away from the idea (by
proposing siting the missiles at sea, while the whole point
of them being land-based was their high visibility), the
United States put on the pressure for acceptance. The
formal proposal was presented to European leaders by David
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Aaron in late July and by early August, Carter's officials
were confidently predicting that "the alliance could agree
formally on a missile deployment plan by the end of the
year.1,35
As events unfolded, various NATO study groups and
committees fell into line by presenting favorable reports.
The theater nuclear missiles proposal was put before the
NATO Council on 12 December 1979 at a meeting in Brussels.
All the member nations agreed in principle on the scheme,
though it took some last minute bargaining to find a
formula which would suit Belgium and Holland. Both
countries had a strong anti-nuclear movement and a
coalition government unsure of its ability to carry out
deployment. Each country delayed accepting the missiles
(Holland for two years, Belgium for six months) to give
priority to the arms control track. All other NATO members,
including Britain, accepted the proposal without
reservations.
Throughout the run-up to the December meeting, the
issue of control for Britain surfaced very briefly in the
press. The New York Times reported on October 10:
The British, although they are willing to have the
missiles, are likely to insist that some of the cruise
missiles be built here under licence and that some be
placed under British control, reaffirming Britain's
position as a nuclear power.
This rather vague report (which gives no indication of how
the "control" would be implemented) was contradicted on
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November 1, when the same newspaper ran a lengthy article,
"Now Europe Shuns Its Nuclear Trigger." This focused mainly
on West Germany and its reasons for not wanting dual-key,
but mentioned other nations which had refused.
Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands...have also indicated
that they will probably want them [the missiles] controlled
by a one-key system.37
Only ten days later, the British Defense Secretary Francis
Pym was putting his full weight behind deployment of
missiles without dual-key.
The secretary said that his first priority was reaching
agreement with Britain's European partners in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization on the deployment of Americanmade and American-manned
cruise missiles here and on the
Continent. 38
•

The proposal presented in December included the offer to
the European nations of a dual-key system, with a price tag
which included some of the research and deployment costs.
There were no takers.
Given that the December meeting was the culmination of
many meetings and in-depth consultation, it is clear that
the whole issue of dual-key control was settled in advance
of the meeting. One can only speculate how far in advance.
It seems highly likely that such a crucial topic would have
at least been raised at Guadaloupe, probably by Schmidt. It
is certainly possible that a single-key policy may have
been agreed upon at that time, just as the dual-track
policy was. Whether dual-key control was rejected at
Guadaloupe or during the consultation process leading up to
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the NATO Council meeting, the rejection became part of
official NATO policy on 12 December, 1979. The Thatcher
government had committed itself to American control for the
cruise missiles which were to arrive in the United Kingdom
in 1983.

CHAPTER IV

THE DUAL KEY DENIED

Given that the Thatcher Government had committed itself
to the deployment of American owned and operated cruise
missiles, 1983 was to prove an extremely uncomfortable
year. There was opposition to cruise right from the
December 1979 announcement. That same month, British
historian and anti-nuclear activist E. P. Thompson went
full tilt at the policy in the course of several pages in
the left-wing political weekly The New Statesman. Popular
sentiment against cruise grew both in size and intensity as
1983 drew nearer. In December 1982, some 30,000 women
protested by encircling the Greenham Common air base,
which, along with the Molesworth base, was to be the site
for the weapons. By 1983, the issue dominated the British
political scene.
Opposition to cruise coalesced into two groups. The
unilateralist group centered around the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament and the Labor Party. The group in favor
of dual-key was more diffuse. The Social Democratic Party
favored dual-key control and there were sympathizers
amongst both Labor and Conservative members of Parliament.
46
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Those members of the public backing dual-key included
unilateralists and multilateralists. At the beginning of
the year, an opinion poll conducted for The Sunday Times
found a staggering 93% in favor of a dual-key for cruise.39
In reply to the Thatcher governments reliance on the
"joint decision," a letter to The Times by a Dr. Terence
Moore of Clare College, Cambridge put the opposing view
most succinctly.
The test case for dual-key comes on the single, critical
occasion where the President and the Prime Minister
disagree. I need hardly elaborate on the possibly
devastating importance of such an occasion.... For the UK to
retain its essential responsibility for British-based
nuclear weapons it should insist, as the SDP in its defence
"White Paper" has insisted, on a double safety catch on
American nuclear missiles based here in the UK. The
country's self-respect demands no less.40
Moore's letter expressed popular support for dual-key very
well. The British public was highly concerned that their
government had no visible, physical control over the firing
arrangements for the missiles and there was also the
feeling that Britain was demeaned by the proposed
arrangements.
The Conservative party itself, not normally given to
the kind of internal feuding so prevalent in the Labor
party, came close to a backbench revolt over dual-key. Alan
Clark, member of Parliament for Plymouth, collected 38
signatures from a broad spectrum of his fellow Conservative
MPs, asking for "a mechanism for sovereign physical control
of theatre nuclear weapons based in this country."41
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(Sovereignty was of course a highly-emotive issue in the
wake of the Falklands war.) It was also felt by
Conservatives in favor of dual-key that the presence of
this control system would end much of the public opposition
to the missiles. After all, the same opinion polls showed
no majority against Britain's own nuclear deterrent. Senior
Conservatives immediately put heavy pressure on Clark and
he finally backed down.
Conservative ministers, led by the Secretary of State
for Defense, Michael Heseltine, flatly rejected the notion
of approaching the American government for dual-key.
Heseltine argued in January that "in 1979 the Americans had
offered a dual-key arrangement, but it had been declined by
the Europeans."42 This was a clear reference to the
ramifications for NATO of Britain deciding to break ranks
and opt for dual-key. The following month, Conservative
ministers were reassuring visiting Vice-President George
Bush that they would not raise the issue with the United
States. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe reaffirmed his
government's commitment to cruise when he visited
Washington in July.
The Conservative government relied on a number of
arguments against dual-key. One primary argument was that
dual-key would cost too much. Another was that the 1952
Churchill-Truman agreement for "joint decision" was
sufficient and any attempt to modify it would severely
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damage the mutual trust enjoyed by the two nations. Other
arguments were that the missiles were guarded by British
Royal Air Force personnel, who were needed to help disperse
the missiles to their launch sites and that installing
dual-key would delay deployment.
The argument that dual-key would simply cost too much
had the merit of being simple, thus more readily delivered
to the public than abstruse calculations of deterrence.
However, it was vulnerable to several counter-arguments.
The most obvious one was that even by the standards of a
government committed to saving money wherever possible, it
was sheer folly to balance the relatively modest financial
benefit of free missiles against a foreign nation being
able to use the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom
for purposes which might lead to the annihilation of the
British people.
Even taking the argument on its own terms, it had
serious deficiencies. As is so often the case with
calculations of defence expenditure, no-one could agree how
much it actually would cost to buy into cruise, and, as is
also so often the case, projections of the costs varied
enormously.
One writer for The Economist came up with a relatively
conservative set of figures:
During the 1979 negotiations on stationing cruise in
Europe, the Americans proposed, not unreasonably, that, if
the Europeans wanted to own the missiles, they should pay
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for them. The entire programme will cost about $5 billion
(in 1980 dollars). Infrastructure costs — buildings,
storage magazines, roads and the like — are shared across
the alliance by an agreed formula. If the missiles were
financed by the same formula, it would cost Britain around
165m at current exchange rates. But, if the British were to
buy them outright, the cost could range from at least 1300m
to over 1500m. While that is not going to break a British
defence budget of over 114 billion, it is not negligible.43
The defence correspondent of The Sunday Times demurred,
and suggested a much less negligible figure:
Installing a dual key would be straightforward enough. Just
as in the late 1950s we bought 60 Thor rockets from America
— the only actual missile ever based in Britain — so,
now, we might buy cruise, for around 11 billion.44
The Conservatives of course gave the least conservative
estimate of all:
Defence Minister Michael Heseltine said Sunday on
television that Britain had rejected the idea of dual
control when cruise missiles were first discussed. He said
existing safeguards were satisfactory and Britain would
have to buy the cruise system at a cost of $1.5 billion to
gain dual control.45
The financial argument cruise was widely regarded
outside the Conservative party as being merely a political
ploy. It certainly can be seen as an attempt to set the
debate in terms which would steer clear of discussion of
the whole notion of "joint decision."
The argument in favor of relying on the Anglo-American
base agreement had a number of serious drawbacks when used
in political debate. One was that it was literally
intangible. The idea of direct physical control was simple
and much more concrete. Another drawback was that since the
agreement was largely secret, there was little that could
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be said about it for public consumption. At least, that was
what Conservatives claimed as they repeated the wording of
the 1952 Churchill-Truman communique ad infinitum.
Parliamentary exchanges such as the one following became
commonplaces during the 1980s.
Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence, in the
worst possible circumstances of a nuclear war, whether
arrangements have been made for consultations with the
United States of America on the use of cruise missiles in
the few minutes available; and whether the United Kingdom
government will have, at any stage of any nuclear
confrontation , the inalienable, unqualified and
unconditional right of veto over their use.
Mr. Pym: As I made clear again in yesterday's debate, the
use of United States forces of the bases concerned in the
United Kingdom would be a matter for joint decision between
the two Governments in the light of the circumstances
prevailing at the time. The bases may not be used without
such a joint decision.46
This deliberate refusal to explain thoroughly how the
joint decision-making process would work lead to
contradictory interpretations. Thus, the British newspaper,
The Guardian carried what was for it an unusually
optimistic view of a nuclear weapons issue. The editorial
for November 6, 1983, noted this argument, as put forward
by Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine:
[Heseltine] said, no British government could signal
conditions which it might wish to impose since it was the
essence of a deterrent strategy that such things should be
hidden from the Russians. That might be taken as a hint
that arrangements between the two governments are tighter
than official statements have revealed — but it is hardly
substantial enough to deter those who want a dual key from
continuing to advocate it.47
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The Economist, however, was a good deal more skeptical
about the implications of the secrecy surrounding the
Anglo-American agreements:
[The agreement] implies a British right of veto before
launching and is apparently much tighter than the "Athens
guidelines" governing American nuclear weapons on the
territories of other NATO countries, which promises
consultation "time and circumstances permitting."
The problem is that the British public has to take it on
trust that the Anglo-American agreement says what the
government claims it does. Obsessed as usual with secrecy
at any price, the British government has never publish the
text. Unpublished, it can hardly be used as the basis of a
campaign to make people pro-cruise. The poll seems to show
either that the British public has never heard of the
agreement, or that it does not believe it says what it is
claimed to say. Mr Heseltine should see that it is
published — unless, after all, it is full of holes.48
Though the publications drew wholly different inferences
about what the secrecy meant, both commented on the severe
limitation of the agreement in making the case against
dual-key.
A third drawback was that while the Conservatives were
trusting the United States for support in time of war, they
were buying from that country the Trident missile system
for use in exactly the circumstance of the United States
failing to give its support. Conservatives trying to square
the circle on that usually prefaced their remarks with a
good deal of special relationship speechifying, then jumped
over the contradiction into an impassioned explanation of
why the United Kingdom required an independent deterrent.
The Parliamentary debate on cruise was held on 31
October was a typically boisterous affair, particularly as
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it was held in the wake of the invasion of Grenada by the
United States. This event was held by many to demonstrate
the impotence of the Conservative government to influence
the nation which was supposed to be so special to the
United Kingdom. Despite the depth of feeling in the country
in favor of dual key, the Conservatives survived the debate
unscathed. Conservative members of Parliament did not break
ranks to vote in favor of dual-key and as the Labor party
was committed to a unilateralist platform, it was not
prepared to support it

either. Only twenty-two votes were

cast for dual-key, all from MPs of the Social Democratic
and Liberal parties.
The debate within the United Kingdom was only half of
the story, of course. The other half lay with the
Americans. Two main sources of information are available
regarding American attitudes. One is the glut of official
documents generated by Congress, particularly from
Congressional committees. The other is the policymakers
themselves.
The main problem in dealing with the documents is that,
for the purpose of this thesis, the most pertinent material
has been deleted on security grounds. However, some
interesting points do emerge, particularly from a
comparative reading of a number of documents.
Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, prepared
by the Congressional Research Service in 1975 from non
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classified sources, is a good starting point. It states
quite unambiguously that the President of the United States
has sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, but
adds that he may delegate this authority "virtually without
#

■

•

limitation"
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,

and that whether such delegations have been

made is unknown. It goes on to say:
THe President's authority to order the use of theater
nuclear weapons in the event of a war involving NATO, while
subject to certain procedural arrangements, is similarly
unlimited.50
It goes on to refer to an agreement to "consult" with NATO
allies and to emphasize that in any event, the President
will control U.S. theater nuclear forces even after they
have been assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR —

NATO's highest ranking military officer). This

last, peculiar arrangement can be effected because SACEUR
is always an American officer (specifically, he is the U.S.
Commander in Chief, Europe) and so under the direct
authority of the President. The analysis surmises:
While a factor the President would undoubtedly consider,
the agreement to consult hardly constitutes a constraint on
his authority; more accurately, the obligation would serve
to influence the President's policy decision. There is
little reason to doubt that the President would consult
with the heads of government of the NATO allies if such
consultations were not considered prejudicial to the
national interest, including the protection of America and
allied forces.51
In neither the section about the United States not that
about the United Kingdom, is there any mention of any
bilateral arrangement regarding nuclear weapons or base
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use. Final authority for the British deterrent is said to
lie with the Prime Minister and the study goes on to
explain how British nuclear weapons are committed to NATO.
There are several striking points here. Nowhere is
there any of the "joint decision" language which British
governments emphasize. Britain is lumped together with the
rest of NATO. Further, American consultation with NATO
allies is regarded as being liable to certain
qualifications. Finally, the lack of limitations on the
President's authority is frequently repeated.
Other documents tend to repeat these points either
singly or in various combinations. A typical example is
another report by the Congressional Research Service, "The
Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces,"
prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee
subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in 1980. The
report notes:
Defense Minister Pym has indicated that the United Kingdom
will have a degree of say in the authorization for use of
the new systems. However, the precise implications of his
statement are unclear.
Remarkably, in the midst of frequent use of the "joint
decision" phrase, the CRS managed to find the sole occasion
upon which a Conservative politician did not stick to that
exact form of words.
If one has doubts about the quality of work done by the
CRS, nevertheless, the records of hearings before the

56

Senate Armed Services Committee for the annual Defense
Department appropriations include similar emphases in
statements given by people closely involved with American
and NATO defense matters. In 1978, Assistant Secretary of
Defense David McGiffert stated:
Theater nuclear forces are responsive to the direction of
the political authorities... only the President can
authorize their use, and that would be done only after
consultation with our NATO allies.52
McGiffert omitted any reference to a bilateral agreement
with the United Kingdom and went on to explain the Athens
Guidelines and how the consultation required by them was
qualified by time and circumstance. In 1982, General
Bernard Rogers, then U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe,
replied to a query by Senator Goldwater, "The ultimate
authority, Senator, is the President or the Prime Minister
for their own weapons."53 He then went on to give a very
brief description of the NATO arrangements for release of
nuclear weapons, failing to mention Anglo-American nuclear
arrangements, despite his immediately prior reference to
the British Prime Minister.
The British press were on several occasions able to
pose direct questions to present and past American
policymakers. The main areas of interest were specifically
how the Americans interpreted the "joint decision" formula
and whether it was even still possible in 1983 to acquire
the dual-key system so long after it had been rejected.
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The Times reported that American officials, from the
distant vantage point of Washington, were expressing bland
surprise that there was anything to debate. Interestingly,
while British politicians were proclaiming that the
Churchill-Truman accord was special, a State Department
official was lumping all the Europeans together.
Agreed procedures have been established within the
alliance, in the event it should become necessary to
consider the use of nuclear weapons [and] have proved fully
satisfactory to successive allied governments...54
All European NATO nations except the UK fall under the
rubric of the Athens Guidelines, which agrees how the
United States would consult its allies if it wished to
release nuclear weapons from their territory. Yet the
British government did not refer to the Guidelines, since
these allow only for "consultation," rather than the "joint
decision" supposedly mandated by the Anglo-American
agreement. Whether the State Department official was merely
speaking in general terms, or had let slip that the true
American attitude was to treat all Europeans equally, can
only be a matter for conjecture.
The Reagan administration publically agreed with the
Thatcher government’s reading of the 1952 document and both
gave as their reason for not going into too much detail
over the exact nature of the decision-making procedure that
the Soviet Union had to be kept ignorant of such matters.
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Hence the following exchange between President Reagan and a
British television journalist:
Mr. Suchet. Mr. President, a major issue in the British
general election is the basing of American cruise missiles
in Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament that she
has received an explanation from you as to who will be in
control of firing these missiles, but you, as yet, have
said nothing publicly. Would you tell the British people
who now is ultimately in control of firing these missiles,
you or Mrs. Thatcher?
The President. Well, let me say that we will — I don't
think either one of us will do anything independent (sic)
of the other. This constitutes a sort of veto power,
doesn't it? But we have an understanding about this and
would never act unilaterally with any of our allies on
this.
Mr. Suchet. I think the British people are very concerned
about the basing of these missiles in their own country.
Perhaps they deserve to be all the more so, since you seem
reluctant to say that the power to fire them does not rest
with you.
The President. Well, they can rest assured. But my
reluctance to say anything is based on the fact that we get
dangerously into the area of telling others not friendly to
us what our policies might be. And I don't think we should
do that.55
While the British and the American governments of the
day were busily broadcasting their interpretation of the
words "a matter for joint decision," the British journalist
David Henshaw was finding a very different interpretation
amongst former members of past American administrations.
Henshaw began with Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger's
interpretation of the phrase:
[Churchill and Truman] issued a communique: the use of
nuclear bases in Britain was to be "a matter for joint
decision." Yes, but what if there were no "joint decision"?
Would Britain have a veto? "The communique," said Mr
Weinberger, "speaks for itself. I don't think it would
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serve any purpose, nor would it be very helpful to you, in
trying to elaborate on words that are perfectly clear."
He then went on to ask several former top American
officials if they thought that the agreement gave the
United Kingdom a veto. He began with Lucius Battle, who, as
senior aide to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, helped draw
up the deal.
So what does Lucius Battle think "a matter for joint
decision" actually means? "I haven't the slightest
idea...Each side perhaps believes, sees, views the
agreement as exactly what he was trying to get... it1s part
of diplomacy in a way." And did the Americans think they'd
given a veto to the British? "No, absolutely not." Even of
nuclear weapons based on British soil? "No." 56
This was also the opinion of one of Battle's
contemporaries, Eugene Zuckert, Assistant US Air Force
Secretary at the time the agreement was made.
And it was Mr Zuckert who, in the end, came up with a
metaphor which left little room for ambiguity. "My feeling
is that a 'joint decision' would mean that a one-one tie
would be construed in favor of the Americans. In other
words, it was not a veto."57
Other policymakers expressed similar views.
No American politician I spoke to thinks it gives Britain a
veto over the use of the bases: according to Paul Warnke,
who was Assistant Secretary of Defence under President
Johnson, it's doubtful if most people in the Pentagon even
know that the agreement exists. Robert McNamara, who had
seven years in charge of Defence in the Sixties, said: "I
don't conceive of it as a veto, no. I think 'consultation'
means a discussion... with the party having the final
authority — in this case the US — making the final
decision." James Schlesinger, Richard Nixon's Defence
Secretary, is a little more flexible: but in the end, do we
have a veto? "I think it comes close to be a veto — but
the intention is that there be an intimate consultation."
Not the same thing as a veto? "It is, if there is time
available." The trouble with crises, of course, is that,
•
invariably, time is
rarely available. 58
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Henshaw then went on to ask how the agreement had been
reached and to what end.
Certainly the Americans wanted Churchill to feel that — as
Lucius Battle puts it — he'd had "a good visit.” As to
what the agreement on the American bases really meant to
each side, there was considerable ambiguity. "I don't
believe that either side wished to mislead," says Battle.
"I think both sides felt they had got as far as they could
in emphasizing the need for consultation, joint
decision. .. if at all possible."59
Finally, Henshaw refers to an event which, in his view,
completely destroyed any claim the 1952 agreement has to
giving the British government a veto.
...three weeks after it [the communique] was announced the
American Assistant Secretary of State Jack McFall, told
Congress: "The talks were not in any sense negotiations
towards final and binding decisions on the part of either
government." The man taking over as British ambassador in
Washington at the time of the Churchill-Truman agreement
was Sir Roger Makin — now Lord Sherfield. He couldn't
recall the McFall announcement but, given the lack of faith
that announcement suggested, how substantial did he think
the 30-year-old agreement was today? "I think binding
agreements dealing with matters of national security are
very difficult to come by and not perhaps wholly to be
relied upon."60
Simon Duke has also argued that the Americans do not
see the 1952 agreement (or similar agreements with other
NATO partners) as constituting a veto. He also quotes
former Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger:
Such consultation procedure does not imply any actual
inhibition on the capability of the United States to
operate the [nuclear] systems.61
He also points out that when the USSR seemed poised to
intervene in the Yom Kippur war, the USA put its forces on
Def Con III without consulting any of its allies. The
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British were told one hour after the decision was made.
Schlesinger, Secretary of Defence at the time, later
admitted there had been time for "consultation and
discussion.1,62 Henry Kissinger's hindsight is even more
chilling: "We could not have accepted a judgement different
from our own."63
THus, the weight of evidence is against the 1952
agreement being construed by the United States as a veto.
Reagan and Weinberger refused to give an unequivocal
assurance that the United Kingdom could indeed positively
veto the use of cruise or the American bases in the UK.
Other officials gave the unequivocal assurance that the
United Kingdom did not hold a veto.
As for dual-key control over cruise, it seems likely
that the Reagan administration was no longer offering it by
1983. The evidence here is circumstantial. David Henshaw
suggests that the offer was withdrawn:
Given the apparent desire of the British public to have a
similar safeguard for cruise (according to the polls) —
and given that Jimmy Carter's administration had offered
dual key four years ago — I asked Mr Weinberger if the
offer still stood. As Christopher Wain suggested recently
in THE LISTENER, it doesn't look like it. "The arrangement
that we have," said the Secretary of Defence, "has always
been considered completely satisfactory to both countries."
So was he saying, in effect, we couldn't now buy a dual
key? "I'm always worried about questions that start out
'Are you saying, in effect?' What I'm saying is what I've
just said."
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Also, The New York Times reported that Secretary of State
George Schultz, on a visit to the United Kingdom in 1983,
had "brushed the idea aside."65
Indeed, from the American perspective, why should dual
key still have been available? The issue had been settled
in 1979. To encourage hope of dual-key in 1983 would have
been giving aid and comfort to Prime Minister Thatcher's
enemies (inside and outside the Conservative party) and
needlessly stirring up trouble in NATO at a time when
maintaining a united front was essential.

CONCLUSION

The special relationship was characterized in chapter
one as having three defining features. These were a common
culture, shared strategic interests, and an informality in
handling relations. The informal diplomacy permitted base
agreements which were quickly drawn up and implemented and
perceived by both parties as in their mutual strategic
interest of containing potential Soviet expansion. The
common culture made the presence of the US servicemen less
of an intrusion than they might otherwise have been. Many
of the British tended not to perceive them as truly
"foreign" in the way that they perceived their fellow
Europeans. The special relationship was absolutely
essential to America being able to build up its forces in
the UK so rapidly and to such a large size.
However, from the British perspective one major problem
emerged with the special relationship in the decade after
the end of the Second World. As John Bay1is observes:
Despite the 1948 modus vivendi. atomic energy clearly stood
out against the web of inter-dependency which was being
woven between the two states at this time66
The British thus went ahead with their own nuclear
programs, while using the informal diplomacy of the special
63
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relationship in their attempts to restore that relationship
to its wartime status of closeness in nuclear matters.
The special relationship eventually permitted a
solution to this problem and one which is unique in recent
history. The solution was (and is) a cruid pro cruo in which
the British received the nuclear technology they needed for
their strategic interests and the Americans received the
bases they needed for their strategic interests. This
trade-off depends ultimately on successive British
governments believing that the possession of a strategic
nuclear deterrent is absolutely essential for Britain's
survival. It also depends on the two nations perceiving
their strategic interests as being broadly convergent. The
informal diplomacy has made the handling of the quid pro
quo relatively simple. The executive branches of both
nations could largely circumvent their respective
legislatures by relying on agreements that lacked the
status of treaties. The governments could also rely on that
style of diplomacy to ensure that the profound differences
in interests which did and do exist need not be emphasized
in political relations between the nations and that when
disagreements do occur, they are quickly left behind.
Successive British and American governments have
believed that the quid pro quo has yielded substantial
benefits. The British can point to the purchase of
strategic delivery systems and emphasize that these are
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independent in the one sense that British governments deem
paramount: Britain ultimately has sole and complete control
over their use. The Americans have their bases and a
minimum of British control over their operational use, as
contrasted with the troubles which have arisen over bases
in, for instance, Spain and Greece.
Outside the nuclear arena, the cruid pro cruo
relationship holds good, too. The British gained crucial
American assistance during the Falklands war and later
reciprocated by allowing the Americans to bomb Libya from
the UK and by doing so in a most public manner. Each nation
helped the other in the face of certain damage to its other
interests. There is also an unusually high degree of
cooperation in the intelligence field.
One crucial reason why cruid pro quo has remained a
guide to action for so long is that in each country there
are well-established bipartisan policies with regard to the
other country. The unspoken agreement between Conservative
and Labor party leaders that Britain requires a nuclear
deterrent has led to an equally tacit agreement that the
agreements on bases must be allowed to stand. This has
overruled both nationalist sentiment within the
Conservative party and unilateralist sentiment within the
Labor party, either of which might have threatened the
American bases. Since there tends to be more of a consensus
in American politics regarding foreign policy, it is not
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surprising to see Reagan following the lead of Carter in
supplying Trident. Finally, we must not underestimate the
personal factor, in that many of the Presidents and Prime
Ministers have struck up very good friendships despite the
inevitable large differences in their backgrounds. Kennedy
and Macmillan are perhaps the most striking pair in this
respect. This friendship and that of Reagan and Thatcher no
doubt smoothed the way for the sales of Polaris and
Trident, respectively.
Why, then, did the Thatcher government resist extremely
strong popular support for a dual-key for cruise? There are
several answers to this. One is that it had the political
will and ability to do so. As a strong government with a
large majority facing a divided opposition, there could
have been little doubt about its ability to prevail,
particularly once the dissenting backbenchers had been put
in their place. Beyond that, the other answers are all
bound up with the special relationship.
The dual-key was probably not being offered by the
Reagan administration. It is entirely possible that it was
never really offered at all and that the issue of control
was settled at Guadaloupe, with the subsequent
deliberations by NATO committees merely rubber-stamping
this decision. The Thatcher government would hardly have
desired the Anglo-American discord and the domestic
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humiliation which would have resulted from asking for
something which was not available.
Even if the dual-key had been available, asking for it
would have created other problems at the same time that it
would have quieted public concern over cruise. Having dual
key for cruise would inevitably have led to even more
questions about control over other American nuclear
delivery systems based in the United Kingdom. It might have
become the thin edge of the wedge, leading to more pressure
for more control over the American systems and hence to
increasingly strained relations with the United States.
Further, if the United Kingdom had asked for dual-key,
other NATO allies would have very likely done so too, and
that would also have led to increasingly strained relations
with the United States. Strained relations, arising from
whatever source, were to be assiduously avoided at a time
when the United Kingdom was in the process of buying
Trident, its next generation deterrent, from the United
States.
As for the parallel issue of control over the bases, it
seems highly likely that the United Kingdom does not have
an effective veto over their use. The United States could
use those bases in a manner not congruent with the
interests of the host nation. However, the Thatcher
government was no doubt well aware that such an act by the
Americans would be both unlikely and difficult to carry
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out. The special relationship is predicated on the belief
that the two nations have highly congruent strategic
interests. Hence, independent action by one nation to the
detriment of the other has been a rare occurrence and this
is likely to hold true for the immediate future. The
presence of British personnel at Greenham Common, for
instance, would make it difficult for the Americans to
operate the cruise units if the British were ordered to
prevent them from doing so. Finally, it seems that the
Thatcher government, in adhering to the base use agreements
as drawn up in 1952, was maintaining the continuity of
British policy in favor of keeping an independent deterrent
and relegating the issue of base use to second place.
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